
Class 
Book. 
GopghtTf- 



£-4?- 



cofwight DEPOSE 



A GENERAL'S LETTERS TO HIS 
SON ON MINOR TACTICS 



A GENERAL'S LETTERS 
TO HIS SON ON 
MINOR TACTICS 




NEW SjWW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 






Copyright, 1U18 
By George H. Dor an Company 



U5034 | 3 



SEP 16 1918 

Printed in the United States of America 



PREFACE 

It has very forcibly been brought home to me 
that not only young officers joining their units 
from training establishments, but also those 
who have been in France and have come back 
wounded, are often very ignorant on those points 
in minor tactics which they have not learnt 
through actual experience on the battlefield, and 
that this is especially the case with regard to 
the proper control of fire. The battlefield is an 
expensive place to acquire knowledge which can 
be gained elsewhere, and it behooves us to do 
all we possibly can to train our young com- 
manders under peace conditions for the ordeals 
they will have to encounter in the presence of 
the enemy. 

Training which in ordinary times would form 
the course of study for years now has to be 
crammed into a few months, and it stands to 

v 



vi PREFACE 

reason that much which is essential remains 
unlearnt. 

I have generally found that the best way to 
train young officers in minor tactics is by giv- 
ing (hem as realistically as possible little prob- 
lems to solve, and afterwards in the presence of 
(heir comrades to discuss their proposed dispo- 
sitions and then to tell them clearly what they 
ought to have done, giving reasons for every 
step taken. 

Where it is possible actually to carry out the 
exercise with troops, this is still better, so long 
as it is all done quickly, as this impresses the 
lesson to be learnt more strongly on the minds 
of the students. 

Many men who are in other ways excellent 
instructors have not the facility for construct- 
ing problems with a point, and this being the 
case, it has occurred to me that I may be gen- 
erally helping (he (raining of young officers by 
publishing these letters which are written in 
continuation of those I addressed to my son on 
obtaining his commission. The importance of 
the subject with which they deal is self-evident. 



PREFACE vii 

Unless the arrow-head, the platoon, be sharp, 
that is, unless the leader be skilful as well as 
brave, the little eombat will not be won, and it 
lis the sum of the little combats which spells the 
result of the battle. 

There is not a word in this little book which 
transgresses the spirit of the training manuals 
and official instructions now in force. 

" X. Y. Z." 



A GENERAL'S LETTERS 
TO HIS SON 

ON MINOR TACTICS 
LETTER I 

December 1, 1917. 

My dear Dick, — 

It is now nearly nine months since I wrote 
the last of my letters of advice to yon, and since 
then yon have yourself been in France and have 
had many experiences and hairbreadth escapes. 

I am very thankful that your wound is only a 
slight one, and am glad that within a couple 
of months you will probably once more be able 
to take your place in the fighting-line, for that 
is where your country demands your presence. 
It behoves you, in the meantime, to seize every 
opportunity of studying your profession and fa- 
miliarising yourself as far as possible with the 

9 



10 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

different positions in which you may be placed, 
so that when you meet a similar situation in the 
field you may recognise it for what it really is, in 
spite of the surroundings in which it is dressed, 
and may thus be more likely to solve it properly 
than would be the case if you were dealing with a 
problem which you had never thought over be- 
fore. It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
importance of the results which may depend on 
your correctly answering the questions put to 
you on the field of battle. These questions be- 
come more complex and more varied as the re- 
sponsibility of an officer's position increases, but 
in the case of a junior officer they are seldom 
very difficult, and all that is required to deal 
with them properly is a little common sense and 
a cool head combined with courage and deter- 
mination. 

It is on the result of the many little fights of 
which an action is composed that the result of a 
battle depends. The brilliant strategy of a com- 
mander-in-chief and the fine tactics of a divi- 
sional commander cannot bear fruit unless the 
troop-leading of the companies is well carried 



ON MINOR TACTICS 11 

out, and in the same way good troop-leading will 
prevent a defeat being turned into a rout. Indi- 
vidual gallantry, valuable as it may be, is bound 
to be thrown away if unaccompanied by skill. 
The experiences you have undergone should 
render you more capable of assimilating the 
requisite knowledge than you were nine months 
ago. 

Before I proceed further, I will mention a few 
axioms which can seldom be neglected without 
bad results accruing. Some of these seem so 
self-evident that it would appear to be unneces- 
sary to state them, nevertheless they are all of 
them continually transgressed. 

1. Impress on your men the importance of 
adjusting their sights correctly. On a peace 
field-day this axiom is sometimes neglected, and 
in the excitement of action it is often entirely 
forgotten. 

2. Keep your men together unless there is 
some very definite object for not doing so, and 
only detach them for protective services, i.e. 
advance guards, etc. 

3. Infantry mounted officers are apt to forget 



12 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

that their horses are given to them in order to 
give them more mobility. There are many occa- 
sions on which, by cantering on and making ar- 
rangements previous to the arrival of the unit 
which they command, they can save a great deal 
of valuable time and often much marching and 
counter-marching. 

4. Never allow the pace in front to be hur- 
ried on a march. It is much easier to march 
at the head than at the rear of a column. 

5. Before opening fire, carefully consider the 
situation. If you feel certain of being able to 
deal with the enemy, let him approach close 
before disclosing yourself, and then destroy him. 
If, on the contrary, he is so much superior to 
you that you cannot hope to be able to do this, 
you should open at a long range, but in these 
circumstances do not hurry the rate of fire to 
begin with. It takes an exceptional man to fire 
more than 200 rounds in a short space of time 
without being shaken. 

6. It is a sound rule always to pursue the 
line of action which your opponent does not wish 
you to pursue. If, for instance, in the circum- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 13 

stances mentioned in the above paragraph the 
enemy open fire on you at a long range, you may 
presume that he does so in order to keep you at 
arm's length, and if you halt you are probably 
doing what he wishes you to do. 

7. However small your party may be when 
acting independently, it is responsible for its 
own protection, and it should always have an 
advance guard or its equivalent. 

8. Whenever you have an opportunity of do- 
ing so, and the tactical situation allows of it, 
check ' your ranges by firing at an auxiliary 
mark where you can see the splash of your bul- 
let, such as a dusty road or water. 

9. When you have ascertained the correct dis- 
tances of the object, make a range-card and pass 
on your information to neighbouring troops. 

10. If you see a good opportunity of inflicting 
loss on the enemy, but it is impracticable to 
check the range, use combined sights. 

11. Remember that if the target you are 
shooting at is large enough and you know the 
range, you can inflict heavy losses with rifle and 
machine-gun fire at ranges well over 2,000 yards. 



14 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

12. Do not forget to make use of the map 
when estimating a range. 

13. Although the secret of success in an en- 
gagement is the proper co-operation of the dif- 
ferent arms of the service, the platoon com- 
mander must not cry out for artillery assistance 
when he has the means of carrying out his task 
in his own platoon, which, with its riflemen, its 
Lewis gunners, its bombers, and its rifle bomb- 
ers, is, in itself, a miniature division. In an 
action where telephonic communication has 
broken down this rule applies with special 
force. 

14. Above all things, impress on your men 
the enormous power of their rifle. I have heard 
many stories of men not firing at all because they 
hoped the enemy would come. within bombing 
range. I have also heard of bodies of German 
troops streaming across the open unfired at be- 
cause no order was given. I have also heard of 
machine guns stopping a German advance, whilst 
infantry who were lying down beside them did 
not fire a shot. 

15. Rifle grenades and bombs both have their 



ON MINOR TACTICS 15 

proper uses, and in trench fighting it would be 
difficult to get on without them. The former 
are also excellent for giving covering fire whilst 
a post is being rushed; but if the infantryman's 
worth be 100, of this 100, 85 per cent, belongs to 
his rifle and bayonet, 10 per cent, to his rifle 
grenade, and 5 per cent, at the outside to his 
bomb. 

16. Never miss an opportunity to reorganise 
your company or platoon, as the case may be, 
ready for the next emergency. 

17. After capturing a trench or work, get 
your Lewis guns into position without any de- 
lay. From a small front they can bring a great 
fire to bear, and they must be given the best 
position. Under the protection given by them, 
the remainder of your command must con- 
solidate. 

(For consolidation, see note to Scheme 7.) 

18. Your duty towards the enemy is your duty 
towards your neighbour reversed. Think how 
he could make himself most objectionable to you 
and act in this manner towards him. 

19. Always be certain that you understand 



16 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

your orders, and if you are in doubt never hesi- 
tate to ask and make certain, even should your 
commanding officer have a short temper. 

20. If you are detached for any specific pur- 
pose you should always rejoin your unit when 
you have accomplished what you were told to 
do. 

21. Do not fail to give negative information. 
Young officers are very apt to neglect this. It 
may be of great importance to a commanding 
officer to know that a certain place is not held 
by the enemy, and this is jnst the kind of infor- 
mation that his patrol leaders are apt to forget 
to send him. 

22. Always insist on any verbal order you 
may give being repeated to you by the recipient 
before he leaves your presence. 

23. In a retirement you send men to the rear 
with orders to take up another position to pro- 
tect your retirement; always see that they are 
accompanied by a competent leader, or when the 
last party falls back they will very likely find 
that their retirement is unsupported. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 17 

Try to remember these axioms. My subse- 
quent letters will be founded on their applica- 
tion. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



w N 



20 40 €0 80 tOO 



300 yd* 




2 



W X Yaw A// flw« 
W 4 Y /7cu£ A^tf/7 captured by us X if/// /?o/tfi 0uf 



18 



LETTER II 

December 7, 1917. 

My dear Dick, — 

I will now proceed to set you a few problems 
in illustration of the axioms which I gave you 
at the end of my last letter. 

The first will be on the subject of taking a 
German pill-box, for I have heard of many in- 
stances of a pill-box holding up the advance of 
a whole brigade for a very considerable period. 
I have also heard how many gallant but badly 
devised attempts to carry it have failed, and the 
lives of officers and men have been sacrificed in 
vain, and how eventually a better commanded 
platoon has succeeded in taking it with very 
little loss. 

Problem 1 

W, X, and Y are three pill-boxes about 150 
yards apart. We are attacking in the direction 

19 



20 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

of the arrows, that is, in a northerly direction. 

Our men following close behind the barrage 
took pill-boxes W and Y; but, partly owing to 
the conformation of the ground and partly for 
other reasons, we failed to take X, and this pill- 
box is now holding up the whole of our advance 
between W, wood, and Y, knoll, with a machine 
gun, which is being fired from the inside of the 
pill-box, and which sweeps the whole ground 
between these points so effectively that directly 
we attempt to advance our men are mown down. 

It is apparent that X has only one machine 
gun in action, though this is a very efficient one. 

From the contours on the sketch, it is evident 
that the ground is convex in formation, that is, 
that it is nearly flat between X and H l , but that 
it slopes rapidly between H 1 and H, between B 1 
and B y and between C 1 and (7. 

The slopes are covered with brushwood. The 
ground between contour 120 and the pill-box is 
meadow land. 

The platoon originally told off to attack X 
was wiped out. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 21 

Problem. 

You have been ordered to take X with your 
platoon and to do so as quickly as possible. 
When you receive these orders you are yourself 
at H, and, as you will see from the sketch, are 
not under fire from X. 

What steps will you take to carry out your 
orders? 

Do not enter into an elaborate dissertation, 
but give short, concise orders, and if you desire 
to do so, append a short statement saying why 
you gave these orders. 

Action considered Correct. 

As there is only one machine gun in action, if 
X be attacked simultaneously from B l and C l , 
either one party or the other should succeed in 
getting to the rear of the pill-box and blowing 
in the door. 

Orders. 

No. 4 Section with the Lewis gun will choose 
a position somewhere to the north of H, and on 



22 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

my signal will open a rapid fire on the loopholes 
of the pill-box at X. No. 3 Section will choose a 
position near B l , and when the Lewis gun opens 
fire, they will open a rapid rifle-grenade fire on 
X. One minute after the Lewis gun has opened, 
No. 1 Section will rush in from C 1 and No. 2 
Section from B l . 

I am aware that in the foregoing problem I 
have made the task of the platoon commander a 
very simple one. I wished, however, to avoid 
any points of controversy. If the ground should 
not be so advantageous for your attack as that 
above depicted, the principle, viz. movement com- 
bined with fire, still remains the same. You 
should bring a converging attack to bear and 
advance your men under cover of the fire of your 
rifle grenades and Lewis guns, and by pushing 
men forward from one shell-crater to another, 
you should generally be able to achieve your 
object if your plan be evolved on sound prin- 
ciples. It is also possible that smoke bombs could 
be used with advantage if the wind be favour- 
able. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 23 

The above problem is one which has often 
been put to young officers on the battlefield, and 
they have not by any means always given a satis- 
factory answer to it, simple as it is. 

Your affectionate father, 

"X. Y. Z." 



N 



° «£> so. ,20 



'60 20Q 



400 yds 




LETTER III 

December 15, 1917. 

My dear Dick, — 

Since the early days of the campaign there 
has been but little fighting in towns or villages 
which have not previously been so knocked about 
that they could better be designated ruins than 
habitable places, but in the event of an advance 
on a large scale towns and villages are certain 
to be the scenes of severe combats. I will there- 
fore give you three little problems in street- 
fighting. When you have read them, the points 
I call attention to will probably seem to you so 
self-evident that you will wonder that I have 
considered it worth while to comment on them. 
Nevertheless, I am not quite sure that you will 
give what I consider to be the correct answers 
to all of them, if you do not turn over the page 
and look at the solutions I have given, before 
stating your own. 

25 



26 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

Problem 2 

The brigade to which you belong has entered 
a town from a southerly direction, and you are 
opposed by an enemy who has entered it from 
a northerly direction. 

The company of which you are in command 
has been allotted the ground between the roads 
B F, C G, both inclusive, your flanks are pro- 
tected, the streets are about thirty feet broad 
with pavements five feet broad, houses run all 
along the streets. 

Answer the folloiving Questions. 

(a) If you w T ere to tell off a section to pre- 
vent the enemy advancing along the street B F 
from a northerly direction, which side of the 
street would it be best for them to occupy, and 
why? 

(b) Your men occupy the streets B D and 
D C, but no man can show his face in the street 
A H, which is covered by machine guns and 
snipers firing from near A, and all men attempt- 
ing to cross the road at D have been shot. Sev- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 27 

eral houses in the street B D have been knocked 
down by shell fire. 

In this street there are six empty wagons and 
in the houses in the street there is to be found 
furniture of all descriptions, as well as ropes, 
harness, and stables, with some horses in them. 
You are anxious to place a barricade across the 
street A H at D, so as to enable you to use the 
crossing at D. How should you set about mak- 
ing this barricade? 

(c) There is a house at H looking right down 
the street A H. Whereabouts in this house 
should you put your Lewis gun, and why? 

Solutions. 

(a) On the western side, because your men, 
shooting out of the windows in a northerly 
direction, would then fire from their right shoul- 
ders without exposing their bodies. 

(b) Fill the wagons with rubble from the 
houses which have been knocked down. Fasten 
sacking or sheets on to the wagon, so as to give 
cover from view between the body of the wagon 
and the ground. Throw a string attached to 



28 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

a brick across the street. By means of this, pull 
over a rope and attach the wagons to this rope, 
and thus pull them into the position you require. 

(c) At the back of a room in the house, where 
you can see but cannot be seen, firing through 
the window. If you choose a window near the 
top of the house and put the Lewis gun on a 
table some distance back in the room, you will 
probably be able to fire over the barricade which 
you are thinking of constructing at D. 

I have put you three definite and very simple 
questions with regard to street-fighting, for it 
may often happen that correct action on the 
spur of the moment when a village is first en- 
tered may result in ground being easily gained 
which would otherwise entail heavy fighting and 
serious loss to capture. 

Street-fighting is a very big subject, and as 
a rule it gradually develops into underground 
warfare. 

Villages entered during a battle often have 
snipers in the top stories or on the roofs of the 
houses, and these are places in which you may 
also place a few good shots with great advantage. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 29 

This is an illustration of the advisability of doing 
to the enemy what you do not like his doing to 

you. 

I will send you another problem next week. 
Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



t N 



Scale 

V2 



V* 



I milt 




30 



LETTER IV 

December 22, 1917. 

My dear Dick, — 

You have told ine that you have ouce or twice 
temporarily commanded a company and have 
asked me whether I think there is any advan- 
tage in a young and active company commander 
being mounted. 

In another part of your letter you ask whether 
I think a defensive position should be taken up 
on a forward or on a reverse slope. 

This latter is a very big question and one on 
which many pages could be written, but I shall 
confine myself here to saying that it is impera- 
tive to hold the crest line in order to get obser- 
vation, but that, owing to the crest line and 
forward slope being so much more vulnerable 
by artillery fire than is the reverse slope, there 
are many advantages in constructing the main 
line of defence well behind the crest. 

I find now that I have tried in a few words 

31 



32 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

to answer jour second question before dealing 
with the first one. The object of giving you a 
horse is, firstly, to enable you to move about 
more rapidly, and consequently to do your duty 
better; and secondly, because a company com- 
mander's work really begins when the march 
is over. It is infinitely more important that 
he should be fresh than that any other man in 
the company should be so. Again, by riding on 
in front and making proper arrangements for 
bivouacs or billets, he may save weary men much 
marching and counter-marching, and, w T hat is 
even more important, he will on other occasions, 
by being able to push on in front, save half an 
hour by thinking out proper tactical dispositions 
before his men arrive. I will now give you a 
little problem which will, I think, illustrate the 
two questions which you have asked me. You 
must, nevertheless, remember that there can be 
no hard-and-fast rule as to where a position 
should be taken up. We cannot alter the ground 
to suit our formation, and therefore our forma- 
tions must be made to suit the ground. The 
proper way to hold ground when the object is 



ON MINOR TACTICS 33 

to fight a rearguard action is quite different 
from the way it should be held to fight a battle 
a Voutrance, and all I will commit myself to 
doing is to give my advice as to how a certain 
piece of ground should be held in certain given 
circumstances. I hope that the following prob- 
lem will, to a certain extent, answer both your 
questions. 

Problem 3 

An advance guard, of which the company you 
command forms part, has been pushed forward 
to seize a position of which the ridge B-I forms 
a part. The main body should reach the posi- 
tion some eight hours after your arrival there. 
You have been told that your first object is to 
prevent the enemy's cavalry seizing the position. 
The enemy's cavalry, accompanied by horse artil- 
lery, may be expected in the proximity of the 
position within an hour or so after your arrival, 
but it is unlikely that his infantry and field 
artillery will arrive much before your own main 
body. The time of the year is July, the hour is 
4 p.m. The soil is sandy, but covered with 



34 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

grass. You are riding at the bead of your com- 
pany, and are about two miles from tbe crest 
wben a staff officer accompanied by the adjutant 
rides up to you and you receive tbe following 
instructions : 

" Our cavalry have reached the crest of tbe 
ridge BCDEFGHI without encountering 
opposition. You will be responsible for the front 
from E to I, both inclusive, until the main body 
arrives, and must make immediate arrangements 
for securing it against attack by hostile cavalry 
and horse artillery. Not a minute is to be lost. 
l r ou will also do your best to prepare the front 
allotted to you for defence against a strong in- 
fantry attack which the enemy will probably 
deliver, though it is unlikely that he will be in 
a position to do so before dawn to-morrow." 

Question 1. 

What would you do on receipt of these orders? 

Action considered Correct. 

You should save time by handing over com- 
mand of your company and yourself cantering 



ON MINOR TACTICS 35 

on so as to examine the ground and carefully 
consider your plans before your company ar- 
rives. The line of argument you should adopt 
on arrival on the ridge should be : " My first ob- 
ject is to prevent cavalry, assisted by horse 
artillery, reaching the ridge, and not a single 
moment is to be lost in doing this. 

" My second object is to consider carefully 
how the ground can best be prepared to resist 
a determined infantry attack early to-morrow 
morning. It is possible that the ridge may be 
subjected to shell fire soon after the arrival of 
my company, and I must make hay whilst the 
sun shines." 

The conclusions you would come to as a result 
of this reasoning would probably be : " It is im- 
probable that I shall be able to entrench the 
whole of my company before the enemy opens 
fire, but at all events I will try to make emplace- 
ments for my four Lewis guns on the ridge be- 
tween E and /. They will thus be about eighty 
yards apart. 

" I will use intensive labour to get these em- 
placements completed quickly." 



36 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

By intensive labour is meant telling off three 
men to each tool used and ordering the man to 
dig with all his might and main for a couple of 
minutes or until he is tired, and then to hand 
his tool over to another man who is ready to 
receive it. By this means more work can be 
done in half an hour than is usually done in an 
hour. For periods of under an hour, when men 
are working against time to achieve some impor- 
tant object, intensive labour is an excellent 
method to adopt, but it is not suited for long 
tasks where its use would wear men out. It is 
especially applicable where the task worked at 
is so small that only a very limited number of 
men can work simultaneously. 

"I will, at the same time, construct trenches 
connecting these Lewis gun posts. It is possible 
that the arrival of the enemy's guns will oblige 
me to relinquish work until the night, but the 
fact that the trenches have been commenced in 
the daytime will very much assist the men in 
their night work. I will afterwards construct 
supporting points at the farm L and between M 
and N on the reverse slope." 



ON MINOR TACTICS 37 

Question 2. 

If you concur with these conclusions, what 
principle will govern your action in putting the 
farm into a state of defence? You will notice 
that the farm shows a bigger front to the east and 
the west than it does to the north and the south. 
It is constructed of strong masonry and has two 
stories. 

Action which is considered Correct. 

You should use the southern rooms in the 
farm for your machine guns rather than the 
northern ones, as you will there be more pro- 
tected from shell fire. You must keep your 
defence as much below ground as possible, using 
cellars if they are available, and otherwise dig- 
ging trenches inside the walls so as to have your 
loopholes a few inches above the ground level. 

Construct head cover with strong baulks close 
over your heads, so that in the event of the whole 
building being brought down, it will not affect 
you, but only give you more cover from high- 
angle fire. If possible put wire round the 



Work for 40 men & 2 m.gs. ortpu/is guns. 
It only requires 40 to hold it. but mould 
give couer to twice as many 





Angles. at B & C arbitrary 
to suit ground. 



38 



ON MINOR TACTICS 39 

northern end of the building. Arrange to flank 
the work between M N, which should in turn 
protect your front. 

Question 3. 

What description of work will you make be- 
tween M and Nf 

Action considered Correct. 

The best form of work to construct will be 
one made on the principle of that shown in the 
annexed diagram. As will be seen, this consists 
of a series of island traverses strung together 
more or less in the shape of an " S." The advan- 
tage of this is not only that it is suitable for 
all-round defence, but that the whole of the 
garrison can fire simultaneously in almost any 
direction, the weakest points being A and D. 
The work shown in the diagram would require 
a garrison of about forty men, but it could give 
cover to eighty. It is less vulnerable by artil- 
lery fire than almost any other form of work. 
It is an easy work to construct in so far that a 



40 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

large number of men can work at it at the same 
time without interfering with each other. The 
acuteness or obtuseness of the angles at B and 
C must depend entirely upon the ground, but it 
stands to reason that the more the angles ap- 
proach right angles, the more is the work suit- 
able for all-round defence. 

The " crucifix " strong point is also a good 
pattern, but I think that the one that I have 
given you is better, as it is in every way a less 
satisfactory mark for the enemy artillery, and 
also gives you quite as good, if not better, oppor- 
tunity of using all your rifles in every direction. 

My next letter will contain a problem for a 
rearguard commander. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



•u 



5 cafe 



*4 



imile 



"5r 



Scale3"«/mtle 




Stone 
f Bridge 



Chalk \ 
Pit * \Ford?6deep 

Slag Farm 




• •- * SlLVtRTON 



42 



LETTER V 

January 1, 1918. 

My dear Dick, — 

The last scheme I gave you dealt with the 
taking up of a position when an attack by a weak 
force was probable within an hour or so of your 
occupying it, and also with the strengthening of 
the same position for an expected attack by a 
stronger force twelve hours later. This one 
deals with a rearguard action. It is straight- 
forward and plain. The object that troops fight- 
ing a rearguard action should have in mind is 
to keep the enemy at arm's length, to punish 
him severely if he is too bold, and at the same 
time not to compromise their own retreat, unless 
duty requires them to sacrifice themselves in 
order to save the main body. I will now set you 
the problem before I make my own solution too 
evident by my remarks. It is my intention to 

43 



44 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

add a few more words at the end of this letter, 
but I do not wish you to look at them until you 
have written your own solution. 

Problem 4 

The banks of the River Lea are steep, the 
river is about four feet six inches deep, except 
near the ford. The bottom is muddy. At the 
ford it is forty yards broad, in most other places 
about twenty yards. The fields on either side 
are firm. The roads shown on the sketch are 
dry and dusty. The soil is chalky. The depth 
of the river at the ford is two feet six inches. 
The date is June 20. 

One of the orderlies attached to you reports 
that at Slag Farm there is a large quantity of 
wire, some of it barbed. 

The brigade to which you belong is retiring 
in a southerly direction. The baggage moved 
in front of the brigade. The time is 5.30 p.m. 
You with your company, to which six mounted 
orderlies have been attached, are near Home 
Farm, the remainder of your battalion, which is 
in rear of the brigade, is passing through Silver- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 45 

ton, when the adjutant rides up to you and gives 
you the following order: 

" Information has been received that a hostile 
cavalry brigade is pursuing. You will take such 
steps as you may consider necessary to prevent 
the enemy crossing the River Lea between Stone 
Bridge and Slag Farm, both inclusive, until 7 
p.m., at which hour you will be relieved by cav- 
alry. You will be careful not to compromise 
your own retreat. Having accomplished your 
task, you will rejoin your unit." 

Problem. 

How do you appreciate the situation, and 
what steps will you take to carry out your in- 
structions? 

Solution considered Correct. 

The River Lea is in all places within 800 yards 
of the ridge, and as the conditions are particu- 
larly favourable for fire action from the ridge, 
there is no necessity for you to place your men 
down the forward slope. The circumstances 
which render the situation so favourable for fire 
action are that it is practically impossible for 



46 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

the enemy's cavalry to cross the River Lea, ex- 
cept at the bridge or at the ford. The bridge 
and the road, with ponds on either side of it, 
just to the north of the bridge, form a defile 150 
yards long, through which the enemy must pass. 
The ponds and the river also afford you an excel- 
lent opportunity to check the range by the splash 
of your bullets. 

By filling the ford with wire you should also 
succeed in making that very difficult to cross. 
The great objection to putting men on the for- 
ward slope is that they will come under severe 
fire from the horse artillery which will accom- 
pany the cavalry, and that under cover of this 
fire the cavalry are much more likely to be able 
to cross than they would be if fired at from a 
concealed position on the ridge. Besides which 
all movement by men on the forward slope would 
be seen and the men themselves would not be able 
to retire until dark. 

Orders. 

1. Nos. 3 and 4 Platoons will proceed under 
Lieutenant Smith to the neighbourhood of Cross 



ON MINOR TACTICS 47 

Farm, where they will take up the best positions 
they can find with the object of protecting the 
crossing of the River Lea. 

It has been reported that a large quantity of 
wire, some of it barbed, is to be found at Slag- 
Farm. Lieutenant Smith will take steps to ob- 
struct the ford with this with the object of 
denying its use to the enemy. 

2. No. 1 Platoon will take up a position near 
Home Farm and No. 2 Platoon near Hope Farm, 
also with the object of preventing the crossing 
of the River Lea. 

3. No. 2 Platoon from Hope Farm will fire 
ranging shots on to the ford at Slag Farm, Chalk 
Pit, and the two road junctions to the north of 
the ford, and when the officer commanding the 
platoon is certain by the observation of his fire 
that he has obtained the correct ranges, he will 
pass this information to the officer commanding 
No. 1 Platoon. 

The officer commanding No. 1 Platoon will 
range on the ponds near the bridge and on the 
road junction to the north of them, and will 
similarly pass the range chart to the officer com- 



48 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

manding No. 2 Platoon. This ranging will be 
carried out at once in order that the ranging 
by Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons may be finished before 
the ranging is commenced by the officers com- 
manding Nos. 3 and 4 Platoons, which will be 
carried out under the orders of Lieutenant 
Smith. 

N.B. — I am quite aware that a company is 
supposed to carry a Barr & Stroud range-finder. 
Although this is an excellent instrument when 
it is in thorough order, there is really no such 
reliable range-finder as a rifle fired at a mark 
which will show the impact of the bullet. 

In the proper solution of the foregoing scheme, 
everything really depends upon your fire orders. 
I am presuming that your men are fairly well 
trained with the rifle. I wish, of course, that all 
our men were trained up to the standard of the 
Old Contemptibles, but " Rome was not built in 
a day," nor can discipline and good marksman- 
ship become part of a man's second nature as a 
result of only a few months' training. If, how- 
ever, your men are reasonably good shots and 



ON MINOR TACTICS 49 

can fire at least fifteen rounds a minute (they 
ought to fire twenty under peace conditions), 
in such cases as the above much more will depend 
upon whether you give correct fire orders than 
upon whether the men are first-class marksmen 
or only moderately good shots. You can com- 
pare a company of first-class marksmen to a 
Choke-bore gun which shoots farther and harder 
but requires a skilled game shot to use with 
advantage, whereas a company of moderately- 
trained shots would resemble an ordinary scat- 
ter gun, with which the ordinary shot would 
probably do more execution. If you give a range 
as 1,200 yards when it is only 1,000 yards and 
you have marksmen, no shots will fall on the 
object; whereas if your company were composed 
of third-class shots, the chances are that it would 
be well sprinkled with bullets. Do not think 
from this that I prefer the third-class shots, for 
that is very decidedly not the case; but if you 
have a highly finished weapon, you want a good 
man behind it, although in the hands of such a 
one it will do brilliant execution. If you have a 
company of good shots and are not certain of a 



50 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

range, your best plan is to fire with combined 
sights and thus to increase the depth of the fire- 
swept ground. This method, although in many 
cases the best to adopt, is bound to diminish the 
efficacy of your fire, for if the correct range be 
1,200 yards and you fire one platoon at 1,000 
yards, one at 1,100, one at 1,200, and one at 
1,300, it stands to reason that you can only hope 
to get a quarter as many hits as you would do 
if you gave the whole four platoons the correct 
range; but even that is better than giving the 
range at 1,000 and missing the mark altogether. 
It is a bad plan to go " Nap" before you have 
looked at your hand. I shall later on give you 
certain little problems for solution in which I 
am of opinion that combined sights should be 
used. In the problem under consideration, how- 
ever, their use would be absolutely wrong. You 
can check all the ranges by seeing the splash of 
the bullets either in the ponds, in the river, or on 
the Chalk Pit, and you should be content with 
nothing except the correct range. Young officers 
are always apt to consider that so long as they 
have taught their company to shoot fairly well, 
they have done their duty with regard to mus- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 51 

ketry. This is, in reality, by no means the case. 
The company is simply the sportsman's gun; 
the commander has to learn how to use it. 

There are many circumstances under which a 
man has to pick out his own target, as, for in- 
stance, when the enemy is attacking, and here 
everything depends upon his individual marks- 
manship. There are, however, many other occa- 
sions in which if 10 per cent, of the effect de- 
pends upon whether the men are first-class 
marksmen or only ordinary decent shots, 90 per 
cent, will depend upon whether the officer gives 
fire orders properly adapted to the situation. 
The above problem is an illustration of this prin- 
ciple. 

You should notice that in my solution I care- 
fully arranged that the party comprised of Nos. 
2 and 3 Platoons should not commence ranging 
until Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons had finished. Were 
they to fire simultaneously, confusion in the 
splashes made by the bullets would be the result. 

Don't forget to hand over your range card to 
your relief. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 






Sco/e 3 = f mile 



A 1000 yds. from 



Flat 



ground 



1 



under 


: plough 


Thin hedgej 
t 


ujilh ditch 


u 


To 
upports 





53 



LETTER VI 

January 7, 1918. 

Problem 5a 

My dear Dick, — 

I will set you another problem. 

The force to which you belong has made a 
night march. Your platoon now forms part of 
a new outpost line. You halted in a ditch at 
line marked D, with a thin hedge on the enemy's 
side of it, which gives you good cover from view. 
Your idea was to use this place as the head- 
quarters of your picket, and as soon as it was 
thoroughly light to throw groups out in front. 
Your platoon consists of forty men and a Lewis 
gun. Soon after dawn and when your men are 
still in the trench at D, you see what you take 
to be a strong platoon of the enemy advancing 
straight towards you from the north; a couple 
of groups of men are fifty yards in front, and 
the remainder of the platoon is advancing in 
fours along a country road, which passes close 

53 



54 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

to your position. You see the platoon when it is 
at A about 1,000 yards off. 
What action will you take? 

Action considered Correct, 

There seems to be every chance of your being 
able to ambuscade this party, and you should 
let it advance until the groups which the main 
body has in front of it are within fifty yards of 
your picquet. You should tell off a few men on 
the flanks to deal with these groups, and turn 
the fire of the whole of the rest of your platoon 
on to the main body. You must be careful to see 
that all your men lie down, that no one but 
yourself has his head above ground level, and 
you must camouflage yourself. The suspense in 
such a situation as this makes great demands on 
the men's discipline, and they are apt to look up 
and be seen by the enemy, thus destroying all 
hope of surprise. 

Problem 5& 

The situation is exactly the same as in Prob- 
lem 5a, except that instead of a platoon advanc- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 55 

ing towards yon, there is a whole company 
marching in fours, with four groups 100 yards 
in front of it. 

What action would you take? 

Action considered Correct. 

Exactly the same as in Problem 5a. The 
enemy is in this case four times as strong as you 
are, but the effect of surprise should more than 
make up for this, and the first minute after you 
open fire should decide the action in your favour. 

Problem 5c 

The situation is again exactly the same as in 
5a and 56, except that a whole battalion with 
eight groups 200 yards in front of it is ad- 
vancing. 

What action would you take? 

Action considered Correct. 

In this case the situation is changed. You 
are an outpost, and your first duty is to warn 
your main body in case of an attack and to give 
it time to prepare itself. It is just possible that 



56 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

if you allow the battalion to approach to within 
300 yards you might deal it such a blow as to 
almost destroy it; but if, on the contrary, the 
covering groups were composed of really good 
soldiers and the companies were well commanded, 
there would be a great chance of your being 
rushed, and this is a risk which you ought not 
to take, for it would compromise the whole situ- 
ation. In these circumstances you should there- 
fore take steps to open a rapid fire on the enemy 
immediately with your men and your Lewis gun. 
Your object in doing this would be to keep him 
at arm's length and delay his advance as much 
as possible so as to give your supports and re- 
serves time to prepare themselves. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



Scale 



'/4 



Scale 3 " ' l mile 



va 



I mil* 





LETTER VII 

January 15, 1918. 

Problem 6 

My dear Dick, — 

In this letter I am going to set you another 
fire problem. It is one in which, presuming 
that the men are fairly well trained in mus- 
ketry, everything depends on the orders given 
by the company commander. 

You are in command of a company and are 
marching in a northerly direction along the road 
W B E, with scouts in front of you. On reach- 
ing the top of the ridge at B your scouts halt 
and beckon to you. You go forward and see 
what appears to be an enemy's battalion at X, 
by the bank of the River Spate. The battalion 
is in close column and the men are lying down 
resting. The country all round the battalion 
is open. There is a thin hedge on the top of 
the ridge ABC through which you can see and 

59 



60 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

through which you could fire, but which gives 
you cover from view. 

State how the situation presents itself to you 
and also give your exact orders. 

Solution considered Correct. 

You should reason with yourself as follows : 
" If I advance beyond the hedge I shall be 
seen and my company will be opposed by a bat- 
talion. There seems to be an excellent oppor- 
tunity of surprising the enemy, who shows no 
sign of moving, with my concentrated fire, and 
I shall consequently make my plans deliberately. 
From my map I judge the distance from the 
top of the ridge to the bridge over the River 
Spate to be 1,300 yards, and the centre of the 
battalion about 1,400 yards, but as I want to 
be quite sure of getting the battalion into 
my bracket, I shall use combined sights. 
I shall first line up the whole company 30 
yards behind the hedge, and then order No. 1 
Platoon to fix their sights at 1,300, No. 2 at 1,400, 
No. 3 at 1,500, and No. 4 at 1,600 yards, with the 
Lewis gun of No. 1 Platoon at 1,350, that of No. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 61 

2 at 1,400, that of No. 3 at 1,450, and that of No. 
4 at 1,500 yards. I shall then order the whole 
company to creep up into position, and when the 
target has been properly pointed out I shall 
blow my whistle, on which every man will fire 
twenty rounds rapid and each Lewis gun six 
drums. At the end of the twenty rounds I can, 
if necessary, correct my ranges. Men are, as a 
rule, more apt to fire high than low, and I should 
have given the ranges 1,200, 1,300, 1,400, 1,500, 
instead of 1,300, 1,400, 1,500, 1,600, had it not 
been that the river will prevent the enemy rush- 
ing straight towards me if he finds the fire is 
high, whereas if my ranges are short he could get 
out of range by retiring. 

Your affectionate father, 

"X. Y. Z." 



Direction in uhich uehaue attached 



£ in uhteh enemy has retired. 




AT^ 



too y as. 



Thhh uood 



Section of ground on which the trench is constructed 



62 



LETTER VIII 

January 22, 1918. 

Problem 7 

My dear Dick, — 

The following is a problem in trench warfare 
such as you may be called upon to solve any day 
in the trenches. 

The company of which you are in command 
has succeeded in getting into a trench a section 
of which is given in the diagram. It has only 
incurred about 10 per cent, of casualties. The 
trench is the last of the German system, and 
there is a clear field of fire for about 100 yards 
in the direction in which the enemy has retired; 
after that there is a thick wood. 

Your telephone communication has broken 
down and it is evident that you will for some 
time have to rely on your own resources. Your 
flanks are secured by troops on your right and 
left. Your company now numbers 120 rank and 

63 



61 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

file. The front allotted to you measures about 
150 yards. The trench which you are now occu- 
pying was considerably shelled by us previous 
to its capture, and what was the rear of the 
trench when the Germans held it, namely II G F, 
has been considerably broken down in half a 
dozen places. It is quite possible that the Ger- 
mans will counter-attack from the wood without 
delay. It is evident from the section of the 
trench depicted on the diagram that you cannot 
fire out of it as it is at present. 

Problem. 

What action will you take to prepare for the 
enemy's counter-attack? 

Solution considered Correct. 

Your position is a difficult one, for there is 
no place from which your men can fire. You 
cannot even use the step C, nor the parapet A K, 
for the parados II G is, as is usually the case, 
eighteen inches higher than is the old crest line 
at A. In the short time at your disposal it will 
be next to impossible to make a continuous step 



ON MINOR TACTICS 65 

so as to enable you to fire over H, and in the cir- 
cumstances the best thing for you to do is to con- 
centrate the whole of your energies on getting 
your Lewis guns into position and to use inten- 
sive labour for the purpose. 1 It is possible that 
you may be able to get one or two of the Lewis 
guns satisfactorily into position at some of the 
places in which the revetment in F G H has been 
knocked down. If, in your company, you have 
half a dozen iron or wire grips which you can 
utilise to pull down the sandbag revetment, you 
will find them of the greatest assistance, for men 
who only have their hands to work with find it 
very difficult to get a grip on a sandbag which 
is in a revetment. 

You must at once place look-out men to give 
you warning of any sign of the enemy assembling 
in the edge of the wood to your front and be 
prepared to open on them with rifle grenades. 

The real advantage that a machine gun or 
Lewis gun has over a rifle is that from a small 
point of vantage one of these weapons can pour 
a tremendous hail of fire, and in such circum- 

i See Problem 3, p. 35. 



66 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

stances as those depicted above there is no doubt 
but that the first consideration should be to get 
your Lewis guns into position. 

If possible, it is best to place these in pairs, 
shooting obliquely and crossing their fire in front 
of you. As soon as this is done you should thin 
out and organise your defence in depth. This 
being carried out, you must determine what lo- 
calities you will hold and where you will have 
your gaps. You should generally have a locality 
in front of any communication trench leading 
up from the rear. As soon as you have deter- 
mined on your localities, you must set-to and 
build a fire step. The next measure to take in 
order of importance is to collect ammunition and 
place it at convenient points. After you have 
done this, try to put wire or some other obstacle 
in front. In advising this, I am presuming that 
you have reached your final objective. Be care- 
ful to remove any old German wire behind you 
which will prevent your own supports coming up 
over the open to reinforce you. Try to get your 
localities marked by lamps at night, that your 
own friends in rear can see where they are. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 67 

Problem 8 

After hard fighting you have driven the enemy 
out of the trench A B C, and he has retired up 
the communication trench D E F in the direc- 
tion of his supports. You are in command of a 
platoon and have been ordered to take steps to 
prevent the enemy again advancing along the 
communication trench E D B. It is not the in- 
tention of your commanding officer to advance at 
present any farther than the points he has al- 
ready reached. The time is an hour before dark. 

What steps will you take to carry out the in- 
structions you have received? 

Solution considered Correct. 

Pull knife-rests * down into the trench D E F, 
also throw wire into it if available. At once put 
a couple of men at the point D to cover the 
trench D E with their rifles. As soon as you are 
able to do so, dig a short trench from G to D and 
place a Lewis gun at G to enfilade D E. You 
may have to wait until after dark before you 

1 A knife-rest is a portable wire entanglement about 10 feet 
long, made upon a wooden frame-work. 



UJJTLrfjTLTnl^ 




nLInMiL 



5/0 20 30 <Q ... 

i — i i i i » yas 



68 



ON MINOR TACTICS 69 

actually carry this out, but you should make 
arrangements for doing it by daylight. It would 
not be a bad plan to tie a few tins on to the knife- 
rests which you have thrown into the trench, so 
that the rattle, if they are moved, will give you 
warning of any one's approach. The Lewis gun 
at G will be practically out of bombing range 
from E F. 

There are as many different types of stops as 
there are different sorts of trenches. Some of 
these types are better than others, but there is 
no type which is suitable under all circum- 
stances. Everything must depend on the exact 
local conditions and on the means at your dis- 
posal. It does not require much ingenuity to 
devise a good stop for a trench if you have 
leisure to think the matter out, but just as a 
remark which would be commonplace if given as 
the result of matured deliberation is regarded 
as brilliant if made as a quick repartee, so in 
tactics to do what is right under fire is quite 
a different thing to answering a question on an 
examination paper. Nevertheless, to have an- 



70 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

swered a similar question on an examination 
paper, or, still better, to have done it as a tac- 
tical exercise, renders it very much more likely 
that you will do the right thing when you are 
faced by a similar problem in earnest. I, there- 
fore, counsel you to carefully consider the dif- 
ferent sorts of trenches which you come across 
and to think out carefully how you would put a 
stop in them, or how you turn them to shoot in 
the opposite direction. In the diagram I have 
given you it is just possible that by cutting down 
the elbow at E, you may be able to enfilade the 
section of trench E-F from A. This would, how- 
ever, depend on the ground and on the actual 
construction of the trenches concerned. 
Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



4' 


^ vr 








-T 


->N 


Trays </o(7r 




Direction 


of the enemy 

_ "w 




/?oo(/ with 


strong Fences <£ ^tfotf 


ditches on both 


sides 




A 


•40 yds.' 


B 

72 




i 



LETTER IX 

February 1, 1918. 

Problem 9 

My dear Dick, — 

This week my letter will be a short one, as it 
only contains one very simple problem. 

You are on outpost duty and have been told 
that the General is very anxious to get one or 
two live prisoners. Your picquet is at some 
cross-roads a quarter of a mile south of the 
road A B marked on the map. You have rea- 
son to believe that it is probable that the enemy 
will patrol down the road A B. A B is a good 
road with strong fences on either side of it, and 
with ditches on the road side of the fence. 

Does any special way of taking prisoners alive 
in this road suggest itself to you? 

73 



74 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

Solution. 

A very good plan to adopt in these circum- 
stances would be what the Japanese used to call 
the trap-door. If your post consists of six men, 
leave four under the leader at A and tell them to 
conceal themselves in the ditch, and place two, 
also concealed in the ditch, forty yards in front 
of the mat B. If the enemy's patrol comes along, 
the men at B should allow it to pass them and 
then give a signal and at the same time them- 
selves take steps to cut off the patrol's retreat, 
whilst the four men at A prevent it advancing 
farther. 

The above little scheme is so simple that I 
should feel that I ought to apologise for setting 
it, were it not that I am quite certain that three 
out of four of your comrades to whom you may 
set it will not give the proper solution. 

I saw a similar little problem given to men 
of different regiments in India. The only troops 
who answered it properly were Pathans. It ap- 
parently much resembles traps which they set 
for one another in their inter-tribal fights. Al- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 75 

though some twenty teams competed, neither 
British troops, Sikhs, Hindustani, Moham- 
medans, nor Rajputs ever managed to success- 
fully catch their men. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



leN 



Scale 0" = tmife 
Scale 



ft 



_J_ 



•** 






• • V 



B 



•V 






£.... 









:: 



Wood 



• « • • *•'•«" 

• » a * * • 









76 



LETTER X 

February 7, 1918. 

Problem 10 

My dear Dick, — 

The problem I am setting you to-day has to 
do with fire control. 

You are on outpost facing in a northerly direc- 
tion and are in command of a picquet consisting 
of the headquarters of a platoon with a Lewis 
gun and thirty men at G. A man who has 
been sent in from a group on your left tells 
you that a company of the enemy is moving 
across your front from left to right along the 
road A B C D E F. He says that the company 
is marching with an advanced guard of one 
platoon about 200 yards in front of it. The 
platoon has a couple of groups 200 yards in front 
of it again. Five minutes after you have re- 
ceived this notice, you see a group of the enemy 
marching from the wood at B. 

77 



78 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

Problem. 

How do you appreciate the situation and what 
action do you intend to take? 

Solution. 

So long as you remain carefully concealed at 
G and your men do not show themselves, it is at 
least as likely as not that the enemy's scouts will 
not discover you. If, however, they should do so, 
your danger will come from the enemy's com- 
pany and the platoon in front of it and not from 
the scouts, and it is with these larger bodies that 
you must make your plans to deal. At this close 
range you ought to be able to put them out of 
action in the first minute after opening fire. If 
your men conceal themselves properly, even if 
the scouts do discover you, they will not do so 
until the enemy's main body is nearing the point 
C. Your orders should consequently be some- 
what as follows : 

" Let every man conceal himself. 

" The Lewis gun and Nos. 1 and 2 Sections 
of the platoon on my command to open fire will 
direct their fire half left on the main body of 



ON MINOR TACTICS 79 

the emeny's company, which will be the rearmost 
party. No. 3 Section will deal with the platoon 
forming the advanced guard, and No. 4 Section, 
taking its orders from the section commander, 
will deal with isolated groups. No man will put 
up his head until I give the order to fire. The 
whole platoon will use fixed sights." 

You should at once issue these preliminary 
orders. If you are not discovered, do not open 
fire until the head of the main body has 
reached D. 

Napoleon used to say that if you ever saw your 
enemy making a mistake, you should give him 
lots of time to make it thoroughly before punish- 
ing him. Do not pull the bait out of the pike's 
mouth until he has properly gorged it. This 
maxim applies equally whether you are dealing 
with armies or only w r ith platoons. I, myself, 
remember in my early days missing a tiger sixty 
yards off, when, if I had only waited, he would 
have walked right under the tree on which I was 
seated. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



-I ■ 



% 



//rufe 



Scale 3' = 1 mile. 



•\Tower*- s ~z. 




House 



V W%« 



Direction of 



- German attack 



«Yj}»» 



80 



LETTER XI 

February 10, 1918. 

My dear Dick, — 

I hope you will master and remember the prin- 
ciples which govern the problem I am setting 
you to-day. Although very simple, it requires 
a little more thought than most of those which 
have preceded it. 

The Germans have broken through our front 
line. Your company, with its four Lewis guns 
and with four Vickers guns which have been 
placed under your command, has been hastily 
thrown into the trench B, which is well con- 
structed and well concealed, and has a good field 
of fire to the east. Four 18-pounder guns were 
in action at a hundred yards north of the trench 
B. but two of these guns have already been put 
out of action by the enemy's artillery. The Ger- 
mans are advancing in great numbers regardless 

81 



82 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

of sacrifice and are now about a mile distant. 
Their object is evidently to take the ridge A C, 
and it is of the utmost importance that they 
should be frustrated in their endeavours. The 
front allotted to you to defend runs from Z 
Clump on the north to U Farm on the south. 
Other troops are responsible outside these limits. 
You have in the trench B 50,000 rounds of am- 
munition besides that which the men have on 
them. You are senior to the officer in command 
of the remaining two 18-pounders. 

What action would you take? and give your 
reasons. 

Comments on the Situation and Action adjudged 
Correct. 

Let us first of all consider how many rounds 
a minute you could expect the troops under 
your command to fire in the following circum- 
stances : 

(a) If the fire were only to be continued for 
two minutes. 

(b) If it were to be kept up for half an hour. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 83 

Rounds, 
(a) If it were to be kept up for two minutes only, 
you might expect 100 infantrymen to fire from 
fifteen to twenty rounds a minute (let us say) 3,200 

Four Lewis guns to fire 600 rounds each in the two 

minutes 2,400 

Four Vickers to fire 750 rounds each in two minutes 3,000 



8,600 



(6) If the fire were to be kept up for half an hour 
you might justly expect infantry to fire at an 
average rate of five rounds a minute . . . 15,000 

It would be unwise to attempt to exceed this aver- 
age rate of fire, for even if your men were muscularly 
able to continue firing at a greater rate, it is a known 
thing that the nervous strain of firing is such that 
there are but few men who can fire 200 rounds con- 
secutively without breaking down, and it is of para- 
mount importance that you should keep a certain 
amount of reserve force in hand in case the enemy 
gets to a really close range. 

Four Lewis guns would during the half-hour be able 
to fire 600 rounds each, and if these rounds were 
fired at fairly long ranges would still be in a 
position to fire 600 rounds rapid when the enemy 
got to close quarters. The platoon commanders 
would, however, be well advised to regard these 
Lewis guns as their reserves and to do nothing 
to risk their being ready to fire 600 rounds at 
the critical moment. They should, therefore, use 
them very sparingly at medium ranges . . 2,400 

Four Vickers Maxims should be able to fire at an 

average rate of 200 rounds a minute . . . 24,000 



In other words, in the two minutes von could 
fire at the average rate of over 4,000 rounds a 
minute, but for half an hour could only keep 



84 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

up an average rate of about 800 rounds a min- 
ute. Another thing to be considered is that your 
average of hits at the closer ranges would be 
greater than they would be at the farther ranges. 
There is, however, no reason why you should not 
inflict as much loss as possible on the enemy at 
medium and long ranges, provided you know at 
what distance to fire. We used to consider in 
South Africa that when we were advancing 
against a position held by the enemy, he used 
to shoot straighter at 500 yards than he did at 
200, for, fine shots as the Boers were, their ex- 
citement at our near approach disturbed their 
accurate shooting. You may therefore expect 
that your men will shoot comparatively better 
when the enemy is at medium ranges than when 
he is very close, provided that they know the 
distance. 

It cannot be expected that you will go in for 
such a long disquisition at a moment w r hen you 
are called upon to act, but you should have con- 
sidered these points beforehand, at all events to 
such an extent that you would have decided to 
open fire when the enemy was still at compara- 



ON MINOR TACTICS 85 

tively long ranges, but to increase this fire as 
he got closer and to reserve the maximum rate 
of fire until you can pour it in with deadly effect. 
You must always remember that you are deal- 
ing with human beings who have nerves and not 
with machines. As I have previously said, the 
above principles should be those on which you 
decide to act, but the first thing you should do 
would be to send to the officer commanding the 
section of guns and inquire from him the ranges 
of any objects within rifle shot which he has 
ascertained, and you should at the same time 
desire him to obtain for you the ranges of any 
other prominent objects near which the enemy 
must pass, so that if his remaining guns are 
knocked out you will know what sights to use. 
Whilst this is being done, you should divide 
your front between your platoon commanders. 
The Lewis guns should remain with their pla- 
toons, but you would be wise to keep the Vickers 
Maxims under your own special command, so 
that you can turn them on to any portion of the 
advancing line which seems especially to threaten 
you. In fact, you should look on these as your 



86 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

reserve. Having thus considered the situation, 
you should issue the following orders : 
" Fire fronts are allotted as under : 

No. 1 Platoon to the right of Farm U. 

No. 2 Platoon from farm U to Y tree. 

No. 3 Platoon from Y tree to farm W. 

No. 4 Platoon to the left of farm W" 
Order No. 2. — " Ranges are being ascertained 
from the artillery and will be passed to platoon 
commanders. Platoon commanders can open fire 
at their own discretion, but must bear in mind 
the enormous importance of being ready in all 
respects to use the full power of their fire should 
the enemy succeed in getting to close ranges. The 
four Vickers Maxim guns will, under my orders, 
fire at any portion of the enemy's advance which 
appears to be especially threatening/' 

The majority of regimental officers now serv- 
ing do not at all appreciate the enormous effect 
of rifle and machine-gun fire at medium and long 
ranges, nor the importance of taking every step 
in their power to obtain the accurate ranges as 
soon as they have taken up a position. The 
effect of the fire of a fairly good company in 



ON MINOR TACTICS 87 

such circumstances as those above depicted and 
acting on the above carefully considered fire 
orders would be enormous, whereas if the fire 
fronts were not properly allotted and if ranges 
were unknown, it would be of comparatively 
little value. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 




88 



LETTER XII 

February 20, 1918. 

My dear Dick, — 

What would you do in the following circum- 
stances? 

A force is retiring in a north-westerly direc- 
tion. The River Lea shown on the map is un- 
fordable. Two companies are acting as the 
point of the rearguard. Their orders are to hold 
the bridges at A and B. The bridge at B is to 
be held until 10 a.m. and the bridge at A until 
10.30 a.m. If they can hold out until these hours, 
it is estimated that it will enable the main body 
to get away unmolested. The trees shown on 
the map are mostly oak, and are on an average 
forty feet high. The roads marked on the map 
are metalled and good. The farm buildings at D 
are strong. You are commanding B Company 
of your battalion, which is at B bridge, and 



90 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

are senior to Captain A., a reliable officer, who 
is occupying A trench just south of A wood. At 
9.15 a.m. two scouts mounted on motor bicycles 
inform you that they have patrolled to the front 
and that none of the enemy are within three 
miles of you except a few companies near E, 
whc are acting as support to an attack which is 
being made against A bridge. At 9.20 a.m. you 
receive the following message from Captain A., 
dated 9 a.m. : " Please do whatever you can to 
support me. I am being heavily shelled, and 
infantry are trying to push across A bridge. I 
fear that there is no chance of my being able to 
hold out until 10.30 a.m." 

What action would you take? State your 
reasons for the manner in which you would act 
and then definitely say what you intend to do. 

Comments on the Situation and Action adjudged 
Correct. 

What you should always aim at is to obey the 
spirit of an order rather than its letter. You 
know Captain A. to be a reliable officer, and he 
says that he fears that he cannot hold out until 



ON MINOR TACTICS 91 

10.30. If the enemy seize A trench before that 
hour, not only will your retreat be cut off, but 
the object of ordering A and B Companies to 
hold the bridges so as to enable the main body 
to get a good start will be defeated. The near- 
est hostile infantry to you, at E, is some two 
miles off, that is to say, some forty minutes' 
march. In the circumstances it is your duty to 
go to the assistance of A Company. The next 
thing is to consider how you can best help him 
to carry out his retirement and also how you 
can best prevent the enemy from following up 
your main body. If you were to march straight 
to A wood, it is doubtful whether you would 
help him very materially. The artillery firing 
from the south of the river would deal with the 
reinforcements you brought up and placed in A 
trench, similarly to the way it dealt with B Com- 
pany. By far your better plan will be to march 
as quickly as possible to D wood and occupy the 
strong buildings at D farm. From the farm 
buildings you will be able to prevent the enemy 
marching along the road from A to X, and 
should be able to comply with the spirit 



92 A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

of the order, and by the delay you will thus 
entail on the enemy's movements you will be 
able to effect the same purpose as if you had 
actually prevented him from crossing A bridge 
before 10.30. You should be able to hold on to 
D farm until artillery are brought up to A wood, 
and should then be able to slip away along the 
road B X. Without aeroplane observation, hos- 
tile artillery could not observe the effect of their 
fire from the S. of the river, as trees intercept 
their view. 

Orders. 

B Company will at once march to D wood and 
occupy D farm. 

Order to Officer Commanding A Company. 

I am marching immediately to D farm, which 
I hope to reach before 10 a.m. From this place 
I shall be in a position to facilitate your retreat 
and prevent your being pursued farther than A 
wood. You may retire as soon as you see that 
I have established myself in the farm buildings. 



ON MINOR TACTICS 93 

Having accomplished the object for which we 
have been sent out, I shall continue iny retire- 
ment to X. 

These twelve little schemes I have set you are, 
as I think you will admit, all very simple, but 
I am willing to wager that you have not an- 
swered all of them correctly, even though they 
were only applications of the axioms which I 
gave in the letter which preceded them. The 
difficulty is, in the heat, of the moment, to decide 
correctly which of the axioms deals with the 
special situation, and nothing but practice will 
get over this difficulty. 

You should always take every opportunity 
of discussing with your comrades little tactical 
situations which have occurred, or those which 
may occur. In talking over the former, do not 
do so with the object of passing censure, but 
merely with the view of learning what to do and 
what not to do should you find yourself in a 
similar situation. 

Whenever you have an opportunity, carefully 
explain the situation to your men. This is neces- 



U A GENERAL'S LETTERS 

sary if you expect them to co-operate intelligently 
in bringing about your designs. 

In the solution of any little scheme which 
you may set to your subordinates, insist on defi- 
nite orders being given and do not be content 
with vague disquisitions. When any little prob- 
lem which you have set has been unsatisfactorily 
solved, let another leader fall in, take command, 
and do it again properly. This is the best way 
to ensure the proper solution being thoroughly 
understood and remembered for application od a 
future occasion. So long as you do not censure 
a superior in front of his men, it is a good thing 
to make your remarks in such a way that every- 
body can hear them. 

You must guard against technical instructors 
giving wrong impressions. The bombing ser- 
geant is inclined to impress on the men that 
there is no such weapon as the bomb. The in- 
structors in the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun 
are also apt to talk so much of the value of the 
weapons in which they instruct that their pupils 
come away with very false ideas. The Lewis-gun 
sergeant, although he never fails to tell the men 



ON MINOR TACTICS 95 

that the Lewis gun can fire at the rate of 600 
rounds a minute, very often does forget to in- 
form them that after firing 600 rounds it takes 
twenty minutes or half an hour to cool before it 
is capable of firing any more. It is all very well 
for these men to be enthusiasts, but you must 
see that they abide strictly by the truth and 
avoid giving false impressions. 

I will close this letter with a few remarks on 
the moral forces. As Napoleon said, these are, 
compared with the physical, as three is to one. 
Men's courage and determination and the will 
to conquer are more than half the battle. The 
situation to-day is no less serious than it was 
when I ended the last of my Twelve Letters to 
you, and it behoves you to devote the whole of 
your time and your energy to making yourself 
in every way efficient, and you must always bear 
in mind that it is possible that the little action in 
the winning or losing of which your right or 
wrong decision may be the principal factor may 
be the turning-point of a great battle. 

Your affectionate father, 

" X. Y. Z." 



